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AN ELO-TYPE RATING MODEL FOR PLAYERS AND TEAMS OF
VARIABLE STRENGTH
DÜRING BERTRAM(1), FISCHER MICHAEL(2), AND WOLFRAM MARIE-THERESE(1)
Abstract. The Elo rating system, which was originally proposed by Arpad Elo for
chess, has become one of the most important rating systems in sports, economics and
gaming nowadays. Its original formulation is based on two-player zero-sum games, but
it has been adapted for team sports and other settings.
In 2015, Junca and Jabin proposed a kinetic version of the Elo model, and showed
that under certain assumptions the ratings do converge towards the players’ strength.
In this paper we generalise their model to account for variable performance of indi-
vidual players or teams. We discuss the underlying modelling assumptions, derive the
respective formal mean-field model and illustrate the dynamics with computational
results.
1. Introduction
Rating systems have become an indispensable tool to rank unobservable quantities,
such as a players’ strength based on observations, for example outcomes of games. Rating
models were originally developed for sports; but are nowadays also used in gaming and
financial markets. The Elo-rating system [1] is one of the most prominent rating systems
– it is used in chess and other two-player zero sum games. Versions of the Elo-rating have
been adopted for many other sports, for example basketball and football, see [2, 3]. Other
prominent rating systems include the Glicko rating system or Trueskill, see [4, 5]. Elo and
Glicko are based on two-player zero sum games (here a player can be a single individual or
an entire team), while Trueskill is used in multi-player situations, as for example in online
gaming, see [5, 6].
Elo himself tried to confirm the validity of the proposed rating system using statistical
experiments [1]. It was not until 2014 that Jabin and and Junca [7] showed the convergence
of ratings towards the players’ strength for a continuous kinetic version of the model. Junca
[8] later analysed the convergence of discrete ratings in Robin-round tournament, in which
players compete against all others in a round and discrete ratings are updated after each
such round. However, in this model the players’ strength did not change in time. Düring
et al. proposed a generalisation in [9], in which players improve and loose skills based on
the outcome of games as well as daily performance fluctuations. A simpler but related
learning mechanism was proposed by Krupp in [10].
Kinetic models have been used very successfully to describe the behaviour of large inter-
acting agent systems in economics and social sciences. In all these applications interactions
between agents – such as encounters in games, the trading of goods or the exchange of
opinions – are modelled via binary ‘collisions’. Toscani [11] was the first to introduce
kinetic models in the context of opinion formation. His ideas were later generalised for
more complex opinion dynamics [12–19], or in the context of wealth distribution [20, 21] or
knowledge growth in societies [22, 23]. For a general overview on interacting multi-agent
systems and kinetic equations we refer to the book of Pareschi and Toscani [24].
The kinetic formulation of the Elo-model by Jabin and Junca assumes that each player
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R, which changes based on the outcome of games. After each match between player i and
j their respective ratings Ri and Rj are updated as follows
R∗i = Ri + γ(Sij − b(Ri −Rj)),
R∗j = Rj + γ(−Sij − b(Rj −Ri)).
(1)
Here b is an odd, monotone, increasing function, usually chosen as b(z) = tanh(νz) with
a scaling constant ν ∈ R+. The parameter γ controls the speed of adjustment. The
outcome of the game is given by the random variable Sij , which takes the values {−1, 1},
corresponding to a win or loss (other, more fine grained outcomes like a tie can be added
in a natural way). It is assumed to equal the expectation of b(ρi − ρj), that is
〈Sij〉 = 〈b(ρi − ρj)〉,
where ρi, ρj are the underlying unobservable players’ strength. Note that the interactions
(1) are invariant with respect to translations and both the rating update (1) and the
expected game outcome Sij depend only on the difference in ρ and R, respectively, so
these variables are defined on R.
Jabin and Junca then derived the corresponding macroscopic model for the distribution
of players f(t, r, ρ) with respect to their rating r and their strength ρ:
∂
∂t
f(t, ρ, r) +
∂
∂r







b(ρ− ρ′)− b(r − r′)
)
f(t, ρ′, r′)dρ′dr′
and initial condition f(0, ρ, r) = f0(ρ, r). Here, the even probability distribution w was
introduced, to account for ranking dependent pairings in tournaments. If w ≡ 1 we
consider a so-called all-play-all game. If w has compact support only teams with close
ratings compete. Possible choices for w are
w(r − r′) = e
log 2
1+(r−r′)2 − 1 or w(r − r′) = χ{|r−r′|≤c}.(3)
where χ denotes the indicator function (or smoothed variants thereof) and c > 0 is the
maximal rating difference between paired competitors. If w > 0 Jabin and Junca [7]
showed that solutions to (2) concentrate on the diagonal, providing the proof that the
ratings indeed converge to the underlying strength.
In this work we propose a generalisation of the Elo-model for teams of players with fluc-
tuating strengths. Our main contributions are the following
• We propose and analyse an Elo-rating for teams, which includes stochastic varia-
tions in the team strength due to changes in the player setup.
• We formally derive the respective Fokker-Planck equations and analyse their be-
haviour for long times.
• We investigate the behaviour of solutions in the special case of competing teams
whose players’ strengths are distributed with a similar variance.
• We illustrate the behaviour of the micro- and macroscopic models with computa-
tional experiments, consolidating and extending the analytical results.
This work is organised as follows: we propose a microscopic generalisation of the well-
known Elo-rating to teams of players and illustrate the behaviour with microscopic simu-
lations in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on the corresponding formally derived macroscopic
model and its analysis. Next we investigate the model in the case of homogeneous teams
in Section 4 and report results of computational experiments. Section 5 concludes.
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2. A microscopic Elo-type rating for teams
We start by proposing a microscopic version of the Elo-rating for players with variable
strength, which can also be used in the context of teams.
2.1. Performance variations in teams and individual players. In the following we
consider a microscopic model, which accounts for performance fluctuations in teams as
well as individuals. These fluctuations may be caused by varying individual or team
performance (due to different line-ups) or for example by card luck. We recall that small
performance fluctuations in the individual strength ρ were modelled in [9] by stochastic
fluctuations in the strength. We will follow a different approach and replace the constant
strength ρ by a random variable λρ defined on a set of possible outcomes Ωρ, which
can be a finite set as well as an interval. This then allows us to define the stochastic
process {λρ(t)}t∈R+ , whose expected value and variance will be denoted by θ := 〈λρ〉, and
σ2 := Var[λρ], respectively.
We consider competing teams Ti, Tj instead of individual players. The corresponding
expected value θ can be interpreted as the mean strength of the team with a chosen line-
up, i.e. a subset of the team’s players who will be playing in a particular game. We assume
similar as in [7], that the expected outcome of the game between Ti, Tj depends on the
difference of teams’ strengths through b:
〈Sij〉 = 〈b(λρi − λρj )〉.(4)
If two teams Ti and Tj with ratings Ri and Rj meet, their ratings and strength after
the game can be updated using again (1) where γ is a scaling constant controlling the
speed of adjustment. It is usually chosen much smaller than the rating scores, in the hope
that a player’s rating slowly converges to its underlying strength. As discussed in the
introduction we make the following assumption on b:
(B) The function b is C3(R), monotonically increasing, bounded, odd and Lipschitz.
Since b is non-linear the expected value and b cannot be interchanged. To calculate the
expected value of Sij in (4) we use the Law of the unconscious statistician [25], e.g. in the












where p̃ denotes the probability of a possible line up xi playing against a line up xj and
the second equality holds if this happens independently of each other. In the following we
always assume this independence of the stochastic processes for team Ti and Tj .
We can Taylor-expand 〈Sij〉 in (5) as described, for example, in [26]. Since we have





〉 ≈ b(θi − θj) +
1
2
b′′(θi − θj)(σi2 + σj2)
=: b(θi − θj) +K(θi − θj , σi, σj).
(6)
Note that the function K is odd in the first argument and even in the other two. Similarly,








2.2. Microscopic simulations. In the following we will illustrate the behaviour of the
microscopic model with various simulations. We consider N teams T1 . . . TN ; each team
has M players with strengths ρik from which m < M distinct players are selected as line-
up for each match. Let ~ρi = (ρi1 , . . . , ρiM ) denote the vector of all players in a team Ti.
We assume without loss of generality that the vector ~ρi is ordered.
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Let us consider first the case that the m players for the line-up are chosen from the






~λik ∈ {0, 1/m}M with |~λik | = 1. Then the stochastic process λt selects each vector ~λik
with equal probability and we have
P (Sij = 1) = b(~λik · ~ρi − ~λjk · ~ρj),
for a match between Ti and Tj . More realistic line-up selection would choose players di-
rectly proportional to their strength. We recall that the Elo-rating is translation invariant,
hence we shift the expected values θ to the interval [0, 10] in the following.
As a first example consider the following football-inspired situation of N = 200 teams
with M = 23 players each from which m = 11 players are selected per match. For any
team Ti we then have θi = 1123
∑
ρik . We investigate two different initial setups for the
teams:
(R1) For every team Ti, i = 1, . . . N , the players’ strengths ρik , k = 1, . . . 23, is chosen




200 (i−1)]. That is ρ11 = . . . ρ123 =
1
115 and ρ200k ∈
1
11 [0, 10] for every k. In other words all teams have an approximate
team strength of θi ≈ 5 with increasing variance σ2i as can be seen in Figure 1a.






+ ηik), k ∈ {1, . . . , 23}, ηik ∈ N (0, 1).
The mean team strength of the first 198 teams is increasing from values around
4 to values around 10 and the variances σ2i are of the same order. In addition
we consider two teams, Germany (i = 199) and Brazil (i = 200), whose mean
value and variance are motivated by the 2014 FIFA World Cup results, see [27].
We scale those values to θGer = 10 as well as θBra = 9. However, we do not scale
the variance - it is signficantly higher in the generated data set, as can be seen in
Figure 1b.










(a) The standard deviation σ for every
team Ti based on rule (R1).











(b) The standard deviation σ regard-
ing θ based on rule (R2).
Figure 1. The standard deviation of the two setups visualised, both
calculated over 104 Monte Carlo experiments per team.
We carry out direct Monte Carlo simulation using Bird’s scheme, see [24], for these two
initial setups. We choose time steps of ∆t = 0.1 and perform 25 matches per time step.
The results were then averaged over 50 realisations after 2 · 106 time-steps. Figure 2
shows the final distribution of teams for the two different initial setups. In Figure 2a
we see clustering around the point (θ,R) = (5, 5) as expected for setup (R1). However,
an interesting phenomenon is that teams with θ < 5 consistently under-perform and
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conversely θ > 5 over-perform, as they lie above and below the line θ = R, respectively.
In Figure 2b, we see convergence towards a steady state for the 198 teams created using
the rule (R2). However, this straight line has a steeper slope than θ = R. Furthermore,











(a) Setup (R1) with increasing vari-
ance in the team performance.













(b) Setup (R2) with constant variance
σ = 1 in the team performance.
Figure 2. Stationary team distribution for setup (R1) and (R2).
3. A macroscopic Elo-model for teams
In general, the expected value θ and variance σ2 of the microscopic model (1) are finite
since they result from discrete, finite random processes. Compared to the formal derivation
of the macroscopic model in previous works [1, 7, 10], we need additional assumptions on
the moments of σ because of the unboundedness of K in (6) in the 2nd and 3rd argument
when passing from micro to macro.
Let f(t, θ, σ, r) be the distribution of teams at time t with expected team performance
θ, variance σ2 and rating r. The derivation of the macroscopic model (9) below is based
on the following assumptions:
(A1) Let f0 ∈ H1(R3) with f0 ≥ 0 and having compact support. Furthermore, we
assume:∫
R3
f0(θ, σ, r)dθdσdr = 1,
∫
R3
Rf0(θ, σ, r)dθdσdr = 0,
∫
R3
θf0(θ, σ, r)dθdσdr = 0,∫
R3
σf0(θ, σ, r)dθdσdr = 1,
∫
R3
σ2f0(θ, σ, r)dθdσdr = Cσ2 .(8)
(A2) Let the interaction rate function w ≥ 0 be an even function with w ∈ C2(R3) ∩
L∞(R3).
In Appendix A we derive the following macroscopic Fokker-Planck equation for the distri-
bution of teams f = f(t, r, θ, σ):
∂
∂t
f(t, θ, σ, r) +
∂
∂r
(a[f ]f(t, θ, σ, r)) = 0, in [0, T )× R3,








b(θ − θ′) + 1
2
b′′(θ − θ′)(σ2 + σ′2)− b(r − r′)
)
f(t, θ′, σ′, r′) dθ′dσ′dr′.
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Here b′′ is the second derivative introduced in (6). We note that the operator a[·] includes
an additional correction term resulting from the variance of the distribution of strengths.
This term’s sign depends on the sign of θ−θ′, either decreasing or increasing the adjustment
of ratings. This is consistent with the under- and over-performance of teams observed in
the microscopic simulations in Section 2.2.2.






f(t, θ, σ, r) dθdσdr = 0.
and therefore
∫
R3 f(t, θ, σ, r) dθdσdr =
∫
R3 f
0(θ, σ, r) dθdσdr = 1 for all times t > 0.
Next, we show the existence of a classical solution to (9) following arguments from [28,
29].
Theorem 1. Assume that the initial datum f0
(1) is compactly supported in the phase space, i.e. supp(r,θ,σ) f0 is bounded,
(2) is C1-regular and bounded:∑
0≤|α|≤1
∥∥∇αr f0∥∥L∞ <∞.





Proof. In the following we consider the ’all play all’ setting, that is w ≡ 1; our arguments
can, however, be generalised for interaction functions w satisfying (A2). We start by
showing that the solution cannot blow up in finite time. Next we prove local in time
existence based on a priori estimates and a fixed point argument. Global existence follows
from a continuation argument using energy estimates.




f(t, θ, σ, r) + a[f ]
∂
∂r




−f(t, θ, σ, r) ∂
∂r
a[f ] = f(t, θ, σ, r)
∫
R3
b′(r − r′)f(t, θ′, σ′, r′) dθ′dσ′dr′,




where L is the Lipschitz constant of b and we used that the total mass equals one. Next














f(t, θ, σ, r) ≤ Lf(t, θ, σ, r),






Hence, the solution cannot blow up in finite time.
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We continue with the existence of a local solution following Theorem 3.1 in [29]. To
this end we investigate the non-linear transport operator H:
H(f) = −f(t, θ, σ, r) ∂
∂r






in the following. There exist positive constants C1, C2 such that
|H(f)| ≤ ‖b′‖L∞ |f | = C1|f |,
|H( ∂
∂r
f)| ≤ |f | ‖b′′‖L∞ +
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂r f
∣∣∣∣ ‖b′‖L∞ = C2(|f |+ ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂r f
∣∣∣∣ ),(14)
because of b being Lipschitz and therefore we have L∞ bounds for its derivatives. Moreover,









, f 7→ (H)−1(−f ∂
∂r
a[f ])
is bounded since we can use the estimates (14) together with the bounded inverse theorem.
Next we consider the solution along the trajectories (θ(t), σ(t), r(t))






a[f(t, θ(t), σ(t), r(t))]f(t, θ(t), σ(t), r(t))
)
dt.
We can then use the previous estimates to choose a t > 0 such that H is a contraction.














and therefore we have the upper bound
F(t) ≤ F(0)eC3t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
The energy bound in W 1,∞ allows us to use the standard continuation principle, giving
the global extension of the local solution. 
We continue by analysing the behaviour of the moments of f . We define the s-th
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The evolution with respect to σ and θ is trivial, as the function does not change with

















b(θ − θ′) + σ
2 + σ′2
2






rb(r − r′)w(r − r′)f ′f dθ′dr′dσ′dθdrdσ −
∫
R6















(r − r′)b(r − r′)w(r − r′)ff ′ dθ′dr′dσ′dθdrdσ
< 0.
(16)
Here, we used the short-hand notation f ′ = f(t, θ′, σ′, r′). Furthermore, we used that for
r−r′ < 0 the function b(r−r′) < 0 is negative, since b is odd and monotonically increasing.
The latter does not hold in general for b+ b′′, however, the second integral vanishes since
the integrand is still odd in θ and r. Therefore, the second moment in r decreases over time
and we expect convergence towards a stationary state. Our computational experiments
confirm this expected convergence. However, we are not able to compute these stationary
states explicitly as it was done in [7].
3.2. Numerical results for the macroscopic model. We perform several computa-
tional experiments illustrating the dynamics of (9) using a finite difference scheme. It is
based on the generalisation of a finite difference scheme for conservation laws with dis-
continuous flux presented by Towers in [30]. This generalisation is straight-forward, as
(9) has only transport in r direction. Let fnj,l,m denote the solution at the discrete points
(j∆r, l∆θ,m∆σ), j, l,m ∈ N, and time tn = n∆t, n ∈ N, with discrete positive increments


















a[fn(r, l∆θ,m∆σ)] dr. The function h is chosen









In Figure 3 we visualise the first marginals
∫
R f(t, r, θ, σ) dσ and
∫
R f(t, r, θ, σ) dθ of the
team distribution at time t = 5 using timesteps of size ∆t = 10−5 and ν = 1. The
computational domain is Ω = [0, 10]× [0, 10]× [0, 1] and the spatial discretisation was set
to ∆r = ∆θ = ∆σ = 5·10−2, the initial distribution of teams uniform and normalised. The
left plot in Figure 3 shows that ratings converge towards the mean strength for θ ∈ [6, 8],
but are blurred for smaller and larger means. We observe a similar over- and under-
performance as in the microscopic simulations in Figure 2b. The right plot illustrates the
decrease of m2,r in the direction θ. The larger the uncertainty σ, the less accurate the
ratings as all teams get a similar rating (around 7).
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Figure 3. Second and third marginal of the team distribution f at time
t = 5 for f0 = 1.
4. Special scaling limits and homogeneous player distributions
Our microscopic computational results suggest that if all teams have the same player
variance, then the ratings converge to the underlying mean team strength. In this case,
however, the integral over σ can be seen as a point evaluation and we can simplify (9) for
constant σ ∈ R+0 :
∂
∂t
f(t, θ, r) +
∂
∂r
(a[f ]f(t, θ, r)) = 0
f(t = 0, θ, r) = f0(θ, r),
(17)






b(θ − θ′) + σ2b′′(θ − θ′)− b(r − r′)
)
f(t, θ′, r′)dr′dθ′.(18)
We discuss the existence of a unique solution and the analysis of the moments. Fur-
thermore we consider the relative energy to prove convergence of the team strengths to
ratings. The existence of a classical solution itself follows from the same arguments as in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Assume that the initial datum f0
(1) is compactly supported in the phase space, i.e. supp(r,θ)f0 is bounded
(2) is C1-regular and bounded:∑
0≤|α|≤1
∥∥∇αr f0∥∥L∞ <∞.
Then, for any T ∈ (0,∞), there exists a unique classical solution f ∈ C1
(
[0, T ) × R2) to
(17).
The proof of Theorem 2 can be easily adapted from the proof of Theorem 1 and is omitted
here. Equation (17) is conservative, hence the total mass is preserved, and the moments
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with respect to θ is zero. Again, the second moment w.r.t. to r is decreasing (using similar

















b(θ − θ′) + σ2b′′(θ − θ′)
)
w(r − r′)ff ′ dθ′dr′dθdr < 0,
using the short hand notation f ′ = f(t, θ′, r′).
The ratio of ν and σ is important in order to be able to show the convergence of the team
ratings to the average strength. This is the case under following assumption:
(B′) b+ σ2b′′ is monotonically increasing.
Note that (B′) holds for example for b(z) = tanh(νz) if 1 + ν2σ2(4 − 6 sech(zν)2) > 0.





(r − θ)2f(t, θ, r) drdθ.









(r − θ)2f dθdr = −
∫
R2












b(θ − θ′) + σ2b′′(θ − θ′)
)
w(r − r′)ff ′ dθ′dr′dθdr < 0.
For r−r′ < 0 we have b(r−r′) < 0, while the opposite holds true for (r−r′) > 0. Because
of (B′) the second term is positive, yielding the stated energy decay.
Assumption (B) together with (B′) gives us bounds for b′′′, whereas we can deduce b′′
being Lipschitz, too, with constant L2. Following the arguments in Jabin and Junca, [7],
we obtain:
Theorem 3. Let f0 be as in Theorem 2 and w ≥ wmin > 0 on suppf0. Then
E(t) ≤ E(0) exp(−2wmin(L+ σ2L2)t),
where L,L2 depend on b, b′′ (and therefore ν) and on suppf0.





(r − r′ − θ + θ′)w(r − r′)[b(θ − θ′) + σ2b′′(θ − θ′)− b(r − r′)]ff ′ dr′dθ′drdθ,
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and by our previous calculations we have that −D(f(t)) = dE(t)dt 6 0. Using similar




(r − r′)wminσ2b′′(r − r′)ff ′ dθ′dr′dθdr < 0.








(r − r′ − θ + θ′)wminσ2[b′′(θ − θ′)− b′′(r − r′)]ff ′ dr′dθ′drdθ.
Using that b, b′′ are Lipschitz and odd we have
(r − r′ − θ + θ′)wmin[b(θ − θ′)− b(r − r′)] ≥ Lwmin|r − r′ − θ + θ′|2
(r − r′ − θ + θ′)wminσ2[b′′(θ − θ′)− b′′(r − r′)] ≥ σ2L2wmin|r − r′ − θ + θ′|2.




(L+ σ2L2)wmin|r − r′ − θ + θ′|2f ′f dr′dθ′drdθ.
We assume w.l.o.g. (due to the translation invariance of the model)∫
R2
rf(t, r, θ) dr dθ =
∫
R2
θf(t, r, θ) drdθ = 0(20)
which gives ∫
R4
(r − θ)(r′ − θ′) f ′f dr′drdθ′dθ = 0.
Then we can deduce
D(f) > 2(L+ σ2L2)wmin
∫
R2







|r − θ|2 f dr dθ = −2wmin(L+ σ2L2)E(t).
Using Gronwall’s lemma we conclude the proof as in [7, 10]. 
We conclude by underpinning our analytical results with numerical simulations.
Micro- and macroscopic simulations. For the microscopic simulation we consider N = 500
players with fixed mean strengths θn, chosen uniformly distributed in [4, 10]. In every
time-step we then choose N (θn, σ) distributed values for the evaluation of Sij . We set
ν = 0.5 and simulate 106 time-steps of ∆t = 0.1 and 25 collisions per time-step over 50
realisations as in the previous simulations described in Section 22.2. On a macroscopic
level, we use the algorithm presented in Section 33.2 reduced by the dimension in σ.
We see a great agreement between the two models in Figure 4 and 5. In addition, we
clearly see the influence of σ on the ranking as discussed in Figure 3. If the variance σ is
large, all teams are rated equally, in particular the ratings converge to 7 for all values of θ.
Or expressed differently: in expectation weaker teams are over-performing and stronger
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teams under-performing. We see a similar effect already in our first microscopic simulations
in Figure 2.
Moreover, the numerical simulations show that ν can be used to balance the variance σ2
and obtain the desired convergence of ratings to the teams’ average strength as discussed
in the previous subsection. If assumption (B′) holds the long-term behaviour of (17) will
be similar to the original Elo model (2) in [7]. This effect can also be observed on a
microscopic level, see Figure 6, where we compare the long-term behaviour for σ = 2 and
different values of ν ∈ {1, 0.1, 0.01}. For ν = 1 all expected values θ ∈ [4, 10] converge to
7 and we get an almost horizontal line in the long-term run. If we choose ν = 0.1 we get
the desired diagonal θ = r as time increases, as in the case ν = 0.01. However, the smaller
value of ν corresponds to a slower convergence towards the stationary state, as can be seen
in Figure 6, bottom right.

































Figure 4. Microscopic team distributions for ν = 0.5 and different values
of σ.
Figure 5. Macroscopic results for Ω = [4, 10]× [4, 10] for different values
of σ and ν = 0.5.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a generalisation of the Elo-rating model for teams of play-
ers with varying strengths, which includes fluctuations in the performance to account for
example for variable line-ups in team sports. Based on the microscopic interaction rules
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Figure 6. A smaller value of ν leads to slower convergence, however,
we can retrieve the desired convergence of R to the expected value θ by
choosing ν sufficiently small. In all simulations we set σ = 2.
we then derived the corresponding kinetic model, proved existence of a solution and anal-
ysed different moments of its solution. These analytical insights indicate the formation of
non-trivial steady states – a hypothesis that is supported by our numerical results. Fur-
thermore, we considered the special case of similar variance σ2, which allowed to formally
derive a lower dimensional equation. Under further smallness assumptions we could then
use techniques from Junca and Jabin, see [7], to show convergence of the rating r to the
expected value θ. The smallness assumption relates to practically relevant parameter val-
ues. For example, in chess the scaling parameter ν in b is usually quite small, around 1400 ,
as reported in [1, 31, 32]. We were able to show numerically, both at the microscopic and
kinetic level, that a large ν leads to the loss of convergence of r → θ. Choosing ν according
to (B′), we obtain the desired convergence and were able to proof this analytically. This
effect also occurs at the microscopic level.
Nevertheless, the microscopic simulations showed that a large σ has a strong impact
on the ratings. The question therefore remains whether fluctuations in the underlying
strength should be included in ρ, see [9], or incorporated in the outcome of the game Sij
(as proposed in this paper). Following [9], performance fluctuations could also be included
via an additional random term in the microscopic interactions. This leads to a PDE with













a[f ] = a[f ](r, θ, t) =
∫
R2
w(r − r′)(b(θ − θ′)− b(r − r′))f(θ′, r′, t) dθ′dr′,
d[f ] = d[f ](r, θ, t) =
∫
R2
w(r − r′)f(r′, θ′, t) dθ′dr′
where the influence of diffusion is determined by the maximum variance σ2 of the team
strengths.
Accounting for uncertainty in ratings through an additional functional dependence and
not via diffusion also happens in the Glicko rating [4], an extension of the Elo rating. How-
ever, here the variable σ is the uncertainty of the rating. It is assumed that σ increases if
players do not compete and decreases if they participate in tournaments. This microscopic
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model could similarly be used to derive a continuous kinetic rating model. Another in-
teresting direction of future research is the combination of performance fluctuations with
learning effects, as considered in [9, 10].
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Appendix A. Appendix
A.1. Derivation of the Boltzmann-type equation. We follow the derivation of [9] for
the corresponding PDE of Fokker-Planck type to study the dynamics of the corresponding
model. We start with the evolution equation for the distribution of teams fγ = fγ(θ, σ,R, t)
with respect to their rating R, intrinsic team-strength ρ and the variance σi. For a fixed
number of teams, N , the interactions (1) induce a discrete-time Markov process with N -
particle joint probability distribution PN (θ1, σ1, R1, θ2, R2, . . . , θN , σN , RN , τ). Then we
can state the evolution of the first marginal from
P1(θ, σ,R, τ) =
∫
PN (θ, σ,R, θ2, σ2, R2, . . . , θN , σN , RN , τ)dθ2dσ2dR2 · · · dθNdσNdRN ,
where τ is the discrete time step using only the one- and two-particle distribution functions
[33, 34] in a single time step,





P2(θi, σi, Ri, θj , σj , Rj , τ)w(Ri −Rj)
(
δ0(θ − θi∗, R−R∗i ) + δ0(ρ− ρ∗j , R−R∗j )
)
·
· dθidσidRidθjdσjdRj − 2P1(θ, σ,R, τ)
]〉
.
Here, 〈·〉 denotes the mean operator with respect to the random variables Sij and the
function w(·) corresponds to the interaction rate function which depends on the difference
of the ratings. This yields a hierarchy of equations, the so-called BBGKY-hierarchy, see
[33, 34], describing the dynamics of the system of a large number of interacting agents.
A standard approximation is to neglect correlations and assume that
P2(θi, σi, Ri, θj , σj , Rj , τ) = P1(θi, σi, Ri, τ)P1(θj , σj , Rj , τ),
By scaling time as t = 2τ/N and performing the thermodynamical limit N →∞, we can
use standard methods of kinetic theory [33, 34] to show that the time-evolution of the
one-agent distribution function fγ (corresponding to P1 and fγfγ to P2) is governed by













φ(θ, σ, r∗) + φ(θ′, σ′, r′∗)− φ(θ, σ, r)− φ(θ′, σ′, r′)
)
·





where φ(·) is a (smooth) test function, with support supp(φ) ⊆ Ω.
A.2. Analysis of the Boltzmann-type equation.





fγ(θ, σ, r, t)dθdσdr = 0.
Therefore, the total mass is conserved, that is∫
R3
fγ(θ, σ, r, t)dθdσdr = 1, for all times t ≥ 0.





rsfγ(θ, σ, r, t)dθdσdr.(22)









fγ(θ, σ, r, t)fγ(θ
′, σ′, r′, t)w(r − r′)·
·
(
b(θ − θ′)− 1
2
b′′(θ − θ′)(σ2 + σ′2)− b(r − r′)+
+ b(θ′ − θ) + 1
2




Hence the mean value w.r.t. the rating is preserved in time and therefore m1,r = 0 for all
times t ≥ 0.
Moments with respect to the variance and expected value. We definems,θ andms,σ2 similar











A.3. Derivation of the Fokker-Planck equation. We now derive the limiting Fokker-
Planck equation in the case γ → 0. Based on the interaction rules (1), which define the
outcome of a game, we compute the expected values of the following quantities:
〈r∗ − r〉 = γ(〈S〉 − b(r − r′))
Var[r∗ − r] = γ2Var[Sij ](26)
〈(r∗ − r)2〉 = γ2(〈S〉 − b(r − r′))2 + Var[r∗ − r] = γ2
(
〈S〉 − b(r − r′))2 + Var[S]
)
with S analogue to (6) where we used 〈X2〉 = 〈X〉2 + Cov[X,X] = 〈X〉2 + Var[X]. Using
Taylor expansion of φ(θ, σ, r∗) up to order two around (θ, σ, r), we obtain
〈φ(θ, σ, r∗)− φ(θ, σ, r)〉 =〈r∗ − r〉 ∂
∂r
φ(θ, σ, r) +
1
2
〈(r∗ − r)2〉 ∂
∂r2
φ(θ, σ, r)+
+ 〈Rγ(φ, θ, σ, r, τ)〉,
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where the remainder term Rγ is given in the Peano-representation of Taylor’s formula via
〈Rγ(φ, θ, σ, r, τ)〉 =
1
2
〈(r∗ − r)2〉 ∂
∂r2






〈S〉 − b(r − r′))2 + Var[S]
) ∂
∂r2
(φ(θ, σ, r̄)− φ(θ, σ, r))
for some 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 with r̄ defined as
r̄ = cr + (1− c)r∗.



















b(θ − θ′) +K(θ − θ′, σ, σ′)− b(r − r′)
)
·
· w(r − r′)fγ(θ, σ, r, τ)fγ(θ′, σ′, r′, τ)
)
dθ′dσ′dr′dθdσr
whereas the remainder R̃γ is given by
R̃γ(φ, θ, σ, r, τ) =
∫
R3













· w(r − r′)fγ(θ′, σ′, r′, τ)dθ′dσ′dr′.
(27)
All summands will vanish for γ → 0 with similar arguments as in [9]. Let us assume
that φ(θ, σ, r) belongs to the space C2+δ(R3) = {h : R3 → R, ‖Dζh‖δ < +∞}, where







Equations (6),(7) together with conservation laws (24) and (25) guarantee the boundedness
of both expectation 〈S〉 and variance Var[S]. Then with this choice of φ(θ, σ, r), both
summands containing ∂∂r2φ vanish using the same arguments as in [11, 35].





φ(θ, σ, r)f(θ, σ, r, τ)dθdσdr =
∫
R3












It remains to show that for suitable boundary conditions equation (28) gives the desired
weak formulation of the Fokker-Planck equation. We calculate∫
R
(









This term is zero, if
lim
|r|→+∞
f(θ, σ, r, τ) = 0(29)
These boundary condition are guaranteed for the Boltzmann equation fγ(θ, σ, r, τ) by mass
conservation and preservation of the first moment m1,r, see (23). Then (28) is the weak
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